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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

PURCHASING POWER, LLC,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

)

v.
BLUESTEM BRANDS, INC.,
Defendant.

Civil Action File No. 2011CV209488

)
)
)
)

ORDER ON BLUESTEM BRANDS, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS AND
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION TO STRIKE REFERENCES TO
VACATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Bluestem Brands, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Tortious
Interference and Unjust Enrichment Claims and Plaintiff Purchasing Power, LLC's CrossMotion to Strike References to Vacated Summary Judgment Order (hereinafter the "Vacated
Order"). Having considered both Motions and the briefs submitted by the parties, the Court
finds as follows:
It is well established that:

[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. In deciding a motion
to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed
them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing
party's favor.
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73 (2008); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-1112(b)(6).

Plaintiff Purchasing Power, LLC ("PPL") allows employees of participating companies
to pay for retail items like appliances and computers through a payroll deduction program. PPL
alleges Defendant Bluestem Brands, Inc. ("Bluestem") created a competing payroll deduction
business called PayCheck Direct using confidential information provided to it by PPL as part of
due diligence for a potential acquisition that ultimately failed.
PPL and Bluestem signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement ("NDA") in September of2010.
The NDA prohibited Bluestem's use ofPPL's confidential information --- which included,
among other things, business processes, procedures and strategies, as well as information about
past, present, or potential customers and vendors --- directly or indirectly for adverse or
competitive purposes.

At the same time Bluestem was conducting due diligence of PPL, it had

assembled a team to develop a big ticket item payroll deduction program. Acquisition
negotiations were terminated on January of2011, and in February Bluestem's general counsel
represented to PPL that it had returned or destroyed all confidential information it had received
pursuant to the NDA.
In April 2011, Bluestem's CEO announced to Bluestem's Board of Directors that it was
moving forward with plans to launch its retail credit program using payroll deduction. Bluestem
executives who had participated in the PPL due diligence subsequently participated in the
development and launch of this program ultimately called Paycheck Direct. PayCheck Direct
launched nationally on May 1,2012.
PPL asserts it first learned of the PayCheck Direct program on September 29,2011, two
weeks before the closing of the sale ofPPL to Rockbridge Growth Equity, LLC. While the sale
ofPPL closed, PPL asserts the sales price was reduced by $5 million because of Bluest em's
forthcoming competitive payroll deduction program. PPL also asserts Bluestem directly targeted
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PPL's clients and aggressively recruited PPL employees. Specifically, PPL learned in June of
2012 that its former Regional Sales Manager, Robert Hillyer,l was working for Bluestem and
was directly contacting PPL customers to promote PayCheck Direct. In July of2012 Bluestem
sent PPL a cease and desist letter advising it that Hillyer was prohibited from soliciting PPL
customers, recruiting PPL employees or competing with PPL for a period of two years following
his employment at PPL. Hillyer was also allegedly disparaging PPL to customers and making
misrepresentations to customers about PPL's broker commission structure, its pricing structure,
and its return policies. Hillyer purportedly disclosed PPL's trade secrets and confidential
information to Bluestem. PPL asserts it lost several client accounts and Bluestem continues to
target PPL's existing and prospective clients and to recruit PPL employees.
After this lawsuit was filed, Bluestem removed this case to federal court. The federal
court granted Bluestem's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 9,2014,

dismissing all of

PPL's claims.2 This dismissal was vacated in 2015 due to a jurisdictional defect and the federal
court remanded the case to this Court. On August 8, 2016, following remand, Plaintiff filed its
Amended Verified Complaint.

In its Amended Complaint, PPL has reasserted three claims -

Count V for Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, Count VI for Tortious Interference
with Existing and Prospective Business Relations, and Count IX for Unjust Enrichment-that
were dismissed without prejudice in the federal suit for procedural reasons.
PPL's Count One for Georgia Trade Secret Act ("GTSA") violations alleges Bluestem
misappropriated trade secrets, including data, formulas, patterns, compilations, programs,

Hillyer's employment with PPL was terminated on or about December 31, 2011.
Bluestem attached the Vacated Order to its Motion and noted that it would be moving for summary judgment on
the claims not subject to this Motion based on the federal court's Vacated Order. Otherwise, PPL does not rely on
the Vacated Order in support of its Motion to Dismiss and the Court has not considered it for purposes of this Order.
As such, Plaintiffs Cross-Motion to Strike References to Vacated Summary Judgment Order is GRANTED to the
extent that PPL asks the Court to disregard the Vacated Order for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss.
I
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methods, techniques, processes, financial data and plans, product plans, and information about
PPL clients, and used those secrets without PPL's consent in connection with creating and
developing PayCheck Direct. PPL's Count Five for tortious interference with contractual
relations alleges that by and through its employees and agents, including Hillyer, Bluestem has
interfered with and continues to interfere with "Plaintiffs contractual relations by improperly
contacting and soliciting Plaintiffs existing clients, and encouraging them to stop doing business
with Plaintiff and to instead do business with Bluestem and its directly competing product line,
'PayCheck Direct'." This Count alleges Bluestem has continued to solicit PPL customers
despite a cease and desist letter informing it that Hillyer was subject to a noncompete and
nonsolicitation agreement. Count Six for tortious interference with existing and prospective
business relations alleges "[b]y advertising, marketing and selling its directly competing product
line 'PayCheck Direct,' which was developed based on the unauthorized use of Plaintiffs trade
secrets and confidential information, Defendant has interfered with Plaintiff s existing and
prospective business relationships with clients who might otherwise purchase Plaintiffs unique
and proprietary products."

This Count further alleges Bluestem continues to solicit PPL's clients

disregarding PPL's cease and desist letter. And finally, Count Nine for unjust enrichment alleges
Bluestem was unjustly enriched to the extent Bluestem obtained PPL accounts "as a result of the
competing PayCheck Direct program which was developed through the unauthorized use of
Plaintiffs trade secrets and confidential information."

Bluestem argues the tortious interference

and unjust enrichment claims are preempted by the GTSA, O.C.G.A. § 1 O-1-767(a),

because

they share the same facts and theory of the case as a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.
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Law
The GTSA "authorizes recovery of damages for misappropriation of information 'which
is not commonly known by or available to the public,' which' [d]erives economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,' and which
'[i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. '"
Insight Tech., Inc. v. FreightCheck, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19,27 (2006) (quoting O.C.G.A. §§ 101-761(4)(A), (B); 10-1-763).

In the absence of an exception, the GTSA "shall supersede

conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of this state providing civil remedies for
misappropriation ofa trade secret." O.C.G.A. § 10-1-767(a). O.C.G.A. § 10-1-767(b) lists the
exceptions to the rule, i.e., civil remedies not preempted by the GTSA, and PPL argues (b )(2)
applies. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-767(b)(2) allows "other civil remedies that are not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret."
The seminal case in Georgia on the issue of preemption is the Robbins case. Under
Robbins, "[t]he key inquiry is whether the same factual allegations of misappropriation are being
used to obtain relief outside the GTSA." Robbins v. Supermarket Equip. Sales, LLC, 290 Ga.
462,466-67

(2)(b) (2012).

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the trial court manifestly

abused its discretion when it granted an injunction prohibiting defendant from using certain
drawings. Id.at 465.

The trial court had determined the drawings in question were not trade

secrets because the plaintiffs had not made efforts to maintain the secrecy of the drawings. Id. at
464. The Supreme Court held the claim for injunctive relief was preempted by the GTSA
regardless of whether plaintiffs could ultimately meet its burden under the GTSA to show that
the drawings were trade secrets. Id. at 465. The Court concluded: "For the GTSA to maintain its
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exclusiveness, a plaintiff cannot be allowed to plead a lesser and alternate theory of restitution
simply because the information does not qualify as a trade secret under the act." Id. Since the
claim for equitable relief was "based on the same conduct as the GTSA claim," equitable relief
was preempted. Id. at 467.
The Supreme Court in Robbins relied in part on a prior Court of Appeals case,

Professional Energy Management ("PEM") v. Necaise, 300 Ga. App. 223, 228 (2009). In the
Necaise case, the Court maintained the "purposes of the GTSA would be subverted if a plaintiff
could state a claim for the misappropriation of proprietary information outside of the GTSA and
thereby avoid its burdensome requirements of proof." See Professional Energy Mgmt., Inc. v.

Necaise, 300 Ga. App. 223, 225 (2009)).

However, relying on a 2007 case from the Northern

District of Georgia, Diamond Power, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that if separate
conduct, such as "the misappropriation of physical property or the improper interference with
contractual relationships respecting something other than proprietary information" was the basis
of the claim, that claim would not be preempted by the GTSA. Id. (quoting Diamond Power at
1346).

Diamond Power explained the logic of a broad interpretation of GTSA's preemption of

alternative claims:
All this is to say that the rule of supersession is guided by the purpose of the
constraints imposed by the GTSA-constraints which require the plaintiff to
demonstrate economic value in claimed proprietary information and reasonable
efforts to preserve its secrecy in order to recover for an asserted misappropriation
of that information. If a plaintiff could alternatively recover for misappropriation
of non-proprietary information or misappropriation of unguarded proprietary
information, the legislative judgment contained in the GTSA-that such
information should otherwise flow freely in the public domain-would be
subverted. And it would make little sense to go through the rigamarole of proving
information was truly a trade secret if a plaintiff could alternatively plead claims
with less burdensome requirements of proof. Since such an attempt to circumvent
those requirements would be "in conflict" with the mandates of the GTSA, the
GTSA renders such claims superseded. But if a claim seeks to remedy an injury
caused not by the misappropriation of proprietary information, but by separate
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conduct-such as the misappropriation of physical property or the improper
interference with contractual relationships respecting something other than
proprietary information-such a claim cannot be said to be "in conflict" with the
GTSA.
Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (citations

omitted).
Applying this standard, the Court of Appeals found the trial court erred in dismissing
PEM's unjust enrichment claim against a former employee (Necaise), his new company
(LUMA), and his new business partner (Allen). Id. The unjust enrichment claim alleged the
defendants were unjustly enriched "not merely by the value of the proprietary information they
allegedly misappropriated." Id. PEM alleged Necaise, while still a PEM employee, sought
expense reimbursement for expenses allegedly benefiting PEM that were actually used to solicit
PEM's clients for LUMA and so the unjust enrichment claim was not preempted. Id. The Court
also found that a claim for conversion was not preempted by the GTSA because, in addition to
misappropriation of proprietary information, PEM alleged wrongful taking of the expense
reimbursements and other "tangible property" like client files. Id. at 227. Finally, the Court of
Appeals held a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations brought against Allen
was not preempted by the GTSA because this claim alleged "Allen assisted Necaise in his efforts
to solicit PEM customers on behalf of LUMA prior to terminating his employment with PEM."
Id. at 226. Therefore, the allegations of Allen's wrongful interference without legal justification

or privilege with PEM's contracts with its customers did not compete with PEM's separate
allegations that proprietary information was misappropriated. Id.
The case law to date presents the Court with an imprecise rule. In Robbins, the drawings
were not trade secrets and the non-GTSA injunctive relief claim was preempted, but in Necaise,
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the client files were not trade secrets but rather "tangible property" and the non-GTSA claim of
conversion was not preempted. Both cases acknowledge there are some non-trade secret

materials that are so clearly non-trade secret they can form the basis of a non-GTSA claim as a
matter oflaw. Thus, as recognized by the Southern District of Georgia, "Georgia case law does
not precisely define what quantum of non-misappropriation allegations will save a non-GTSA
claim from preemption." Candy Craft Creations, LLC v. Gartner, No. CV 212-091, 2015 WL
1541507, at *14 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2015) (noting that if the Georgia Supreme Court thought that
Necaise's holding went too far in limiting GTSA's preemption power, it could have said so).
Analysis
Count Nine: Unjust Enrichment alleges Bluestem was unjustly enriched to the extent
Bluestem obtained PPL accounts "as a result of the competing PayCheck Direct program which
was developed through the unauthorized use of Plaintiffs trade secrets and confidential
information." There are no allegations that funds or other tangible property were
misappropriated as in Necaise. Instead, PPL alleges Bluestem enriched itself by taking "trade
secrets" and "confidential information." These allegations are solely based on the same factual
allegations of misappropriation in Count One for Violation of the GTSA. The Court finds that
Count Nine for Unjust Enrichment is preempted under the GTSA and Bluestem's Motion to
Dismiss Count Nine is GRANTED.
Count Five: Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations3 alleges Bluestem and
its employees have interfered with and continue to interfere with "Plaintiff's contractual relations

"In establishing a cause of action for malicious or tortious interference with business relations, the appellants must
demonstrate that the appellee (1) acted improperly and without privilege, (2) purposely and with malice with the
intent to injure, (3) induced a third party or parties not to enter into or continue a business relationship with the
appellants, and (4) for which the appellants suffered some financial injury." Tom's Amusement Co. v. Total Vending
Servs., 243 Ga. App. 294,298 (2000). "A cause of action for intentional interference with contractual rights must be
based on the intentional and non-privileged interference by a third party with existing contractual rights and
relations." Id.
3
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by improperly contacting and soliciting Plaintiffs existing clients, and encouraging them to stop
doing business with Plaintiff and to instead do business with Bluestem and its directly competing
product line, 'PayCheck Direct'."

PPL alleges Hillyer was contacting PPL customers, in breach

of the terms of his employment, to disparage PPL and to make misrepresentations

about PPL's

broker commission structure, its pricing structure and its return policies. Notably, Count Five
does not mention Bluestem's use ofPPL's trade secrets or any other information that could
arguably qualify as trade secrets. PPL's allegations that Bluestem and its employees were sharing
disparaging and false information about PPL rather than proprietary information are not the same
factual allegations of misappropriation as raised in Count One for Violation of the GTSA. The
Court finds PPL has adequately stated a non-GTSA claim and Count Five for Tortious
Interference with Contractual Relations is not preempted under the GTSA and Bluestem's
Motion to Dismiss Count Nine is DENIED.
Count Six: Tortious Interference with Business Relations alleges "[b]y advertising,
marketing and selling its directly competing product line 'PayCheck Direct,' which was
developed based on the unauthorized use of Plaintiff's trade secrets and confidential
information," Bluestem has interfered with PPL's business relationships "with clients who might
otherwise purchase Plaintiffs unique and proprietary products."

"Defendant willfully and

knowingly continued to solicit Plaintiffs clients notwithstanding cease and desist demands and
the pendency of this lawsuit." PPL argues Hillyer's actions in contacting PPL customers despite
his non-compete and non-solicitation terms of his employment agreement are different and
additional allegations than the allegations of Bluestem's misappropriation of trade secrets and
confidential information.
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Here, if the misconduct PPL is complaining about was either the sale of a product
developed through the misappropriation ofPPL's information or the wrongful use ofPPL's
customer list, it would be preempted by the GTSA. The Court recognizes that in Georgia,
customer lists mayor may not meet the statutory requirements to be considered trade secrets
under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4). A customer list is not a trade secret if the customer list was
readily obtainable by proper means, for instance. SeeO.C.G.A.

§ 10-1-761(4)((A);Leo

Publications, Inc. v. Reid, 265 Ga. 561 (1995). Similarly, a customer list is not a trade secret if
the list is maintained in a former employee's memory and there is no evidence the employer took
reasonable steps to ensure the confidentiality of that information. See Smith v. Mid-State Nurses,
Inc., 261 Ga. 208 (1991). On the other hand, tangible customer lists containing the identities of
and specific information concerning actual customers have been considered trade secrets,
particularly where employees signed an agreement to keep the information confidential. See
Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Lab, Inc., 263 Ga. 615 (1993); Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Atlanta, Inc. v.
Holley, 284 Ga. App. 591 (2007).

The Court recognizes there is authority that client lists may

not be considered trade secrets and thus, would not be preempted by the GTSA. See Necaise
(allowing conversion claim for taking of client files). However, the Supreme Court in Robbins,
as discussed above, instructs the court to determine GTSA preemption without regard to whether
the requirements to prove a trade secret can be met. Here, Count One alleges Bluestem violated
the GTSA by misappropriating trade secrets including, among other things "information about
PPL clients." Thus, this Court concludes that to the extent this claim alleges Bluestem
wrongfully used PPL's customer information to target PPL's customers, this claim would be
preempted by the GTSA, whether or not PPL can ultimately show the customer information was
a trade secret because both claims rely on the same factual allegations.
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However, there are allegations in Count Six that are additional and different from those in
Count One. PPL alleges it informed Bluestem in a cease and desist letter that Hillyer was subject
to a noncompete and nonsolication agreement with PPL, but Bluestem continued to allow Hillyer
to contact current and prospective PPL customers to sell its competing product. These different
allegations save this claim from preemption by the GTSA. The Court finds that Count Six for
Tortious Interference with Business Relations is not preempted under the GTSA and Bluestem's
Motion to Dismiss Count Six is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 12th day of December, 2016.

~\L:.~
HON. MELVIN K. WESTMORELAND, JUDGE
Fulton County Superior Court Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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